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Introduction
A power measure has the monotonicity property if a larger player is always assigned at least as much power as a smaller player in the same weighted voting game. It is well known that some power indices like the public good index (Holler and Packel, 1983 ) and the Deegan-Packel (1978) index fail to satisfy this property. Violations of monotonicity have been considered unacceptable in a power measure (for example, Felsenthal and Machover (1998) regard nonmonotonicity as a "serious pathology").
Holler and Napel (2004) question whether nonmonotonicity should automatically disqualify an index. They point out that there is more to a decision rule than weights and quota. Monotonicity may be violated due to the relative position of the players in a policy space. Owen (1971) and Shapley (1977) constructed generalizations of the Shapley-Shubik index assuming that players have an ideal point in the policy space and prefer policies that are closer to their ideal point; these power indices are not necessarily monotonic. Similarly, Laruelle and Valenciano (2005) note that a voter with a greater weight may be less likely to be decisive because of the probability distribution over vote con…gurations. If there is one large right-wing party and three small left-wing parties, it may be that the small parties tend to vote together in which case the large party cannot a¤ect the outcome.
In this paper we provide an example of nonmonotonicity that does not rely on any asymmetry of players' preferences. There is a resource to be divided and players have symmetric preferences: each player would like to keep the whole resource. Players bargain over the resource according to a noncooperative bargaining procedure that treats all players symmetrically ex ante. Hence, the only way in which players di¤er from each other is in their weight. We will show that a player with a greater weight may have a lower expected payo¤ than a player with a smaller weight in the unique subgame 2 perfect equilibrium of this game.
The noncooperative game is essentially the demand commitment bargaining model introduced by Morelli (1999) and further analyzed by Montero and Vidal-Puga (2007) . In this game, players demand a share of the resource sequentially, and a coalition may form as soon as it has enough votes and its members have compatible demands. In case there is more than one feasible coalition, the player who made the last demand also decides which coalition forms. The order of moves is determined in advance by the …rst mover.
The weighted majority game in our example is an apex game. Apex games are weighted majority games with one major player (the apex player) and n 1 minor players (in order for the game to be asymmetric, n must be at least 4). There are two types of minimal winning coalitions: the apex player together with one of the minor players, and all the minor players together.
We will show that the apex player's expected payo¤ is smaller than that of a minor player, thus the equilibrium of this game violates monotonicity.
By choosing a particularly favorable order of moves, a minor player is able to get the entire resource as a …rst mover; the apex player is not able to do the same. If all players have the same probability of being …rst mover, it follows that a minor player expects a greater share of the resource on average.
The intuition for this result is as follows. Suppose there are three minor players. If one of the minor players is chosen to be the …rst mover, it can choose an order of moves such that the apex player moves last and then demand the entire resource. The next minor player to move might then try to form a coalition with the apex player by demanding a positive payo¤.
However, this demand can always be undercut by the third minor player, so the second minor player is helpless: any attempts to form a coalition with the apex player will be sabotaged. Hence the second mover may as well go along with the …rst mover and demand 0. Once the second mover demands 0, the third mover is helpless as well: any positive demand on its part will result in the apex player forming a coalition with the second mover, so the third mover may as well go along with the …rst mover and demand 0. This is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the game as we will discuss in section 2. In comparison, the apex player cannot demand more than 2=3 as a …rst mover. If it demands more, there is no obstacle to the three minor players demanding 1=3 each and excluding the apex player. It is also assumed that extra players can never turn a winning coalition into a losing one (T 2 W whenever S 2 W for S T N ) and two disjoint coalitions cannot both be winning (S 2 W and T 2 W implies S \ T = ?). We assume that there is a resource of size 1 to be divided, and W is the list of coalitions that are able to enforce a division of the resource.
The simple game is a weighted majority game if there is a vector w = (w 1 ; :::; w n ) of non-negative voting weights and a quota q such that S is winning i¤ P i2S w i q. Our assumptions above imply 0 <
Apex games have one major player (the apex player) and n 1 identical minor players (n 3). There are two types of minimal winning coalitions:
the apex player together with one of the minor players, and all the minor 1 Montero and Vidal-Puga (2007) already noted that a player may be able to get the entire resource using the weighted majority game with w = (3; 2; 2; 1; 1) and q = 5 as an example. Their example does not violate monotonicity because all players are able to obtain the entire resource by moving …rst, so that expected payo¤s are 1=5 for each player.
4 players together. Apex games are a particular type of weighted majority games with w = (n 2; 1; :::; 1) and q = n 1.
A power measure y is a mapping that assigns a non-negative real value to each player i in the simple game. We will denote the power of player i in the game (N; W ) as y i (N; W ), or simply y i . A power measure is monotone if w i w j implies y i y j for any two players in the same weighted majority game [q; w].
The noncooperative bargaining model
Bargaining proceeds as follows. A player is chosen to be the …rst mover (we will assume each player is equally likely to be selected regardless of its weight).
The …rst mover then chooses an order of moves for the remaining players.
Once the order of moves is determined, each player i makes a payo¤ demand is more than one possible S, player i decides which one is formed. 2 If the last mover forms no coalition, the game ends with each player getting zero.
Example of nonmonotonicity
Consider the simplest possible asymmetric apex game with w = (2; 1; 1; 1) and q = 3. We now show that a minor player can obtain the whole resource when moving …rst, even though the rules of the bargaining procedure allow the next movers to form a coalition without the …rst mover.
Claim 1 Suppose a minor player is designated as the …rst mover, and chooses an order of moves so that the apex player moves last. Then the …rst mover obtains the entire resource in any subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the game.
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose player 2 is the …rst mover and chooses the order of moves 2, 3, 4, 1. We solve the game by backward induction. The challenge will be in showing the uniqueness of SPE payo¤s, and for this we will need to show that players 3 and 4 must demand 0 in equilibrium after player 2 demands 1.
We start by analyzing the subgame in which player 1 gets the move. If player 1 gets the move, it faces demands
it is optimal for player 1 to set We either player 4 forms f2; 3; 4g, or it gives the move to the apex player, who must then form coalition f1; 4g (the second of these two equilibria will not be extensible to the overall game as we will see below). 
and let g be the real-valued function g (x) = min (d 2 ; x). Since both functions are continuous, f strictly decreasing and g increasing, it is straightforward to check that the maximum value of x that yields f (x) g (x) is uniquely
given by x = 1 2d 2 when d 2 < , and this is the demand it makes in any SPE.
(Note that if player 2 solved ties in favor of the minor player coalition the maximum achievable value of d 1 would not be well de…ned, which is why in order for strategies to constitute a SPE player 2 must solve ties in favor of player 1).
There are two ways in which monotonicity is violated in the SPE of this game. If we look at what a player can get conditional on being the …rst mover, a small player is able to get more than the large player. If we look at the situation from an ex ante point of view, assuming that all players have the same probability of being …rst mover, it is still true that each small 10 player has a greater expected payo¤ than the apex player. The apex player can get only 2 3 , and only when it is the …rst mover. A minor player can get 1 as a …rst mover (and may get 1 3 with some probability, depending on how the apex player chooses the second mover).
Concluding remarks
The lack of monotonicity of power indices such as the Deegan-Packel (1978) Under this assumption, player 1 expects a payo¤ of 1 4 , whereas player 2 expects 7 24
. However, if we endogenize coalition formation and assume that a player will not join a particular coalition if there is another coalition in which it can get a greater payo¤, coalitions f2; 3; 4g and f2; 3; 5g would be ruled out. The coalition structure core under equal payo¤ division would be ; 0; 0), corresponding to coalitions f1; 2g and f1; 3g.
A coalition like f2; 3; 4g with payo¤ division (0; We have shown that nonmonotonicity is not con…ned to power indices, but can occur in the equilibrium of a noncooperative bargaining game with endogenous coalition formation and payo¤ division, even though players are rational and di¤er only in their weight.
The lack of monotonicity of payo¤s in our example could be avoided by modifying the noncooperative bargaining procedure. Bennett and van 4 Let m be the least number of players in a winning coalition, let S be the set of winning coalitions with m players, and let S k be the set of winning coalitions with m players involving player k. Player k's expected payo¤ would be 1 m jS k j jSj : Let i and j be such that w i < w j . It is clear that jS i j jS j j. This follows immediately if S i is a subset of S j .
If not, it is easy to see that for each coalition in S i nS j there exists a coalition in S j nS i . Let T be a coalition in S i nS j . Coalition T 0 = T nfig [ fjg is also winning and has m members, hence T 0 2 S j nS i .
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Damme (1991) study a more elaborated version in which each mover selects the next mover, so that the order of moves is not known in advance. VidalPuga (2004) assumes that the order of moves is randomly determined in advance, and only the last mover can form a coalition. Fréchette et al. (2005) assume that the next mover is randomly determined after each move. All these models lead to monotone expected equilibrium payo¤s in our example, though some of them need re…nements of SPE in order to achieve a unique prediction. Also using re…nements, it can be shown that monotonicity is always satis…ed in the proposal-based legislative bargaining model of Baron and Ferejohn (see Montero, 2012 ).
